Liens: Priority of Mechanic’s Lien over Small Business Administration Mortgage (Hammer v. Chapin, D. Mont. 1966) by Carl, William J
Montana Law Review
Volume 28
Issue 1 Fall 1966 Article 5
7-1-1966
Liens: Priority of Mechanic’s Lien over Small
Business Administration Mortgage (Hammer v.
Chapin, D. Mont. 1966)
William J. Carl
University of Montana School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Legal Shorts is brought to you for free and open access by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Montana
Law Review by an authorized editor of The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law.
Recommended Citation
William J. Carl, Liens: Priority of Mechanic’s Lien over Small Business Administration Mortgage (Hammer v. Chapin, D. Mont. 1966), 28
Mont. L. Rev. (1966).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol28/iss1/5
RECENT DECISIONS
LIENS: PRIORITY OF MECHANIC'S LIEN OVER SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRA-
TION MORTGAGE.-The plaintiff's predecessor performed work and supplied
materials for a building on defendant's land, and filed a notice of lien
within the statutory time.1 In an action to foreclose the lien, the de-
fendant Small Business Administration 2 sought to establish the priority
of its mortgage over the lien, although it had been made after notice of
the lien had been filed. Held, the mechanic's lien has priority over the
mortgage.3 Hammer v. Chapin, 256 F. Supp. 818 (D. Mont., 1966).
The exact problem presented by this case was covered neither by
statute nor by case law.4 The applicable federal statute does not give
priority to SBA liens, although it does subordinate them to certain tax
liens. 5 Therefore, priority had to be sought elsewhere. When the debtor
is insolvent, express priority is given to debts owing the United States,
whether secured by liens or otherwise. 6 A number of cases involving the
insolvency statute were called to the attention of the court, but were
rejected because the debtor was solvent. Other cases involving the tax
lien statutes were likewise summarily rejected, since no tax lien was
involved.7
In the absence of legislation to the contrary, the common law rule of
"first in time is first in right" has generally been adopted in determining
lien priorities.8 It is widely accepted and appplied where the priority of
the United States is not made paramount by statute,9 and it has been
applied to federal mortgage liens. 10
1REvisED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 45-502. (Heinafter, REVISED CODES O MONTANA
will be cited R.C.M..)
2The United States of America is the defendant named in the caption of the report.
(Hereinafter, Small Business Administration will be cited SBA.)
8R.C.M. 1947, §§ 45-501 to 45-512, particularly § 45-506, which provides that
".. . liens attach . . . in preference to any prior lien, encumbrance, or mortgage
upon the land . . .1 and § 45-504, providing that such liens "1 . . . shall be prior to
and have precedence over any mortgage, encumbrance, or other lien made subsequent
to the commencement of work on any contract for the erection of such building,
structure, or other improvement."
'Instant case at 820.
815 U.S.C. § 646 (1958).
831 U.S.C. § 191 (1958).
726 U.S.C. § 6321 (1954).
8Rankin v. Scott, 25 U.S. 177, 179 (1827); United States v. New Britain, 347 U.S.
81, 85 (1954); In re Lehigh Valley Mills, Inc., 341 F.2d 398 (3d Cir. 1965); United
States v. Christensen, 218 F. Supp. 718, 729 (D. Mont. 1963).
OMeyer v. United States, 375 U.S. 233, 236 (1963); United States v. New Britain,
supra note 8, at 85; United States v. City of Greenville, 118 F.2d 963, 966 (4th Cir.
1941). See also United States v. Gilbert, 345 U.S. 361, 365 (1952).
'°United States v. County of Iowa, 295 F.2d 963, 966 (4th Cir. 1961) citing City of
New Brunswick v. United States, 276 U.S. 547, 555 (1928); Southwest Engine Co. v.
United States, 275 F.2d 106, 107 (10th Cir. 1960); United States v. Roessling, 280
F.2d 933, 935-936 (5th Cir. 1960); United States v. Latrobe Construction Co., 246
F.2d 357, 364 (8th Cir. 1957).
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The "first in time, first in right" rule dates back to 1827.11 The
quality of the lien preceding the federal lien was not called into question
until more than a hundred years later. Then, in Spokane County v. United
States,12 the doctrine of the inchoate and general lien was born. That case
held that a federal tax lien defeats a prior lien that is not specific and
perfected. In Spokane, two counties had assessed taxes against the debtor's
personal property, before and after he went into receivership. Upon
receivership, the federal lien was accorded priority under the insolvency
statute.' 3 The Court emphasized that the counties' liens were not "spe-
cific" and "completed" by distraint. 14 The opinion upheld a state court
ruling that under Washington law, a county tax lien did not exist until
the property had been distressed.
Subsequent decisions siezed upon the requirements of specificity and
completion without reference to the state characterization of the lien as
non-existent, even though this point was the basis of the Court's decision
in Spokane. In one case, a lien for franchise taxes on the property of a
corporation in receivership was claimed, I6 but these taxes had not been
assessed or liquidated until after the receiver had been appointed. Jus-
tice Cardozo suggested that the result would have been the same even
if the state tax had been liquidated prior to attachment of the federal
priority under the insolvency statute, since there had been no change of
title or possession. In his words, the lien was but "the lien of a tax not
presently enforcible, but serving merely as a caveat of a more perfect lien
to come,' 17 although under New York law the lien took precedence over
prior and subsequent mortgages.'8 Another case extended the doctrine
of choateness to a tax lien which was prior to all other existing liens.19
The Court suggested that prior cases did not require the subordination of
unsecured claims of the United States to prior specific and perfected
liens.20 Then, in the fact of a state decision that a statutory landlord's
lien was choate, 21 the Court held that it was a matter of federal law
whether a lien under state law was sufficiently specific and perfected. 22
Finally, in Gordon v. Campbell,23 the strictness of the doctrine came
to full flower. Not only was the test of identity, certainty and definite-
ness imposed; the Court further suggested that specificity and perfection
uRankin v. Scott, supra note 8 at 179.
"279 U.S. 80, 93-94 (1929).
-31 U.S.C. § 191 (1958). This statute gives priority to tax liens in insolvency eases.
Price v. United States, 269 U.S. 492 (1926).
"Spokane County v. United States, supra note 12 at 94-95.
25Exchange National Bank v. United States, 147 Wash. 176, 265 Pac. 722 (1926).
"New York v. Maclay, 288 U.S. 290 (1933).
17d. at 294.
"New York Terminal Co. v. Gaus, 204 N.Y. 512, 98 N.E. 11 (1912).
"United States v. Texas, 314 U.S. 480 (1941).
"Id. at 486.
2United States v. Waddil, Holland & Flinn, Inc., 182 Va. 351, 28 S.E.2d 741, 746(1944).
"United States v. Waddil, Holland & Flinn, Inc., 323 U.S. 353, 356-357 (1945).
-329 U.S. 362 (1946).
[Vol. 28
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required a transfer of title or possession.24 In United States v. Vermont2"
the State of Vermont had imposed a tax lien on the property of a solvent
taxpayer, and the United States imposed a similar lien thereafter. Since
the assessment had the force of a judgment and subjected the debtor's
property to summary seizure to satisfy the debt,26 the lien was held suf-
ficiently choate.
Most of the cases involved in the development of the doctrine of
the choate lien involve tax liens or the insolvency statute. The few cases
not rising under these statutes are not of significant help in determining
whether a different standard of choateness should be applied in the
instant case, since they do not turn on questions of competing security
interests. For example, United States v. Yazel 27 turned on a question of
the Texas law of coverture. Other cases have involved freight refunds,28
defective chattel mortgages under the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938,29
and the California bulk sales law.80
The present state of the requirement of choateness a' is clearly set
forth in In re Lehigh Valley Mills, Inc. :82
The rule of Federal common law is the general equitable principle,
"first in time is first in right." United States v. City of New Britain,
347 U. S. 81, 85, 74 S. Ct. 367, 370 (1954). That test requires that alien competing with one of the Federal Government must be choate-
i. e., the identity of the lienor, of the property bound by the lien, and
of the amount of the lien all must be certain. United States v. City
of New Britain, supra at 84. The last requirement, of course, is only
met if there is no further opportunity for judicially contesting the
amount of the lien. Thus, the lienor must either have obtained judg-
ment on the lien or it must be enforcible against the property by
summary proceeding.33
It is submitted that the Montana mechanic's lien in the principal case
does not meet the test. It cannot be enforced summarily because there
must be a trial governed by the code of civil procedure (Title 93) .4 In
the principal case, the lien had not been reduced to judgment.
The effect of this decision is to hold that the rule of choateness is
inapplicable to cases not arising under the insolvency or tax lien statutes,
since it rejects cases founded on those statutes,3 5 and seems to reject the
concept of choateness itself.3 6 The court noted that federal liens do not
"Id. at 376. See also United States v. Gilbert Associates, Inc., 354 U.S. 361 (1953).
-377 U.S. 351 (1964).
"Id. at 359.
-382 U.S. 341 (1966).
'United States v. Bethke, 132 F. Supp. 22 (1955).
'United States v. United Aircraft Corp., 80 F. Supp. 52 (1948).
'Bumb v. United States, 276 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1960).
"See generally Annot., 90 A.L.R.2d 1179, 1181 (1963); 94 A.L.R.2d 748, 781 (1964);
7 L. Ed.2d 904 (1962).
'Supra note 8.
OId. at 401.
-R.C.M. 1947, §§ 45-507 and 45-508.
'Instant ease at 820.
'Id. at 821. The rules of choateness set forth in In Be Lehigh Valley Mills, Inc., supra
note 8, are: certainty of identity of lienor, property bound by the lien and amount of
1966]
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have any special quality of perfection or priority simply because they are
federal, and asked what standard should be fashioned.3 7 That standard
was supplied by the Montana policy of preferring the mechanic's lien over
the mortgage, 38 and the court declined to establish a federal rule differing
from the local rule. The prime consideration thus becomes one of balanc-
ing the competing federal policy against the Montana deference to the
mechanic's lien. 39
The federal policy is "founded not so much upon any personal
advantage to the sovereign as upon motives of public policy, in order to
secure an adequate revenue to sustain the public burdens and dis-
charge the public debts. ' 40 Concern with federal revenue has not since
faded, and the policy which moved the court then still has force. Sig-
nificantly, the language quoted above was substantially repeated in
Spokane County v. United States,41 and as has been noted, Spokane gave
birth to the doctrine of choateness.
The competing policy found early and exact expression in Montana
in Mochon v. Sullivan,42 tried in the Territorial court in 1871:
[The mechanic's lien] is remedial in its character, rests upon the
broad foundation of natural equity and commercial necessity.
The doctrine upon which it is founded is upon the consideration of
natural justice, that the party who has enhanced the value of prop-
erty . . . shall have a preferred claim on said property....
This policy was supplemented by the more mundane observation of the
court in the instant case that liens and mortgages share equal infirmities
in the law, and that the United States can protect itself by ordinary busi-
ness prudence.
4a
the lien. The court notes that a mortgage is no more certain than a lien in these
respects, since both mortgage and lien are subject to controversy. A footnote con-
tinues as to certainty of amount in this language: "The point is that the facts do
exist. Any uncertainty lies in the capacity of the court, in the event of a controversy,
to determine the pre-existent facts. If this uncertainty is a truth which courts must
take into account, it exists quite as well in the mortgage case as any other." Minor
lien statutes are not considered in the opinion and are therefore not considered here;
see, e.g., INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2800(e) (distilled spirits tax lien).
1
7Instant case at 821.
-R.C.M. 1947, §§ 45-504 and 45-506, supra note 3.
"Instant case at 821. See Mochon v. Sullivan, 1 Mont. 470 (1871); Federal Land
Bank v. Green, 108 Mont. 56, 90 P.2d 489, 491 (1939) (natural equity and commer-
cial necessity); Smith v. Gunnis, 115 Mont. 362, 144 P.2d 186, 189 (1943) (providing
payment of claims out of the property to which their work and material have con-
tributed an increased value.) The later cases do not discuss the underlying philosophy,
but tend to limit their observations to a statement that the law should be liberally
construed to effect its purposes and policies. See, e.g., Leigland v. MeGaffick, 135
Mont. 188, 388 P.2d 1037 (1959).
4United States v. State Bank of North Carolina, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 29, 35 (1832). See
also United States v. New Britain, supra note 8.
uSupra note 12 at 92.
'2Supra note 39.
"Instant case at 821. The lienholder, on the other hand, is arguably less able to protect
himself against a SBA mortgage subsequently made, since presumably he is less well-
staffed and less conversant with the details of the law than his competitor. Further,
no prudence can guard against a mortgage made invulnerable by the doctrine of
choateness should that be invoked successfully.
[Vol. 28
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Other cases have approved diversity of rules flowing from the
applicability of local laws, as against a uniform federal rule. 44 Bumb v.
United States,45 cited as apposite in the opinion, 46 found no reason to im-
pose a uniform federal rule. Bumb held that the Small Business Admin-
istration, presumably staffed by competent personnel familiar with the
laws of the states where it does business, can acquire valid security
interests in the various states. The transaction, local in nature, should
accord with sound and well-established local policies. 47 Justice Fortas
could find no overriding federal interest which would justify overturn-
ing the Texas coverture law in favor of the SBA in United States v.
Yazell,48 and noted Bumb with approval.
The result of this case, as in all cases involving choices among valid
and reasonable policies, will be welcomed or deplored according to the
philosophy of the reader. It is submitted that the result in favor of
mechanic's liens is correct. Choateness has been a tool for appropriating
the benefit of the mechanic's labor and materials to the government,
leaving the artisan with only the surplus after the sovereign's share is
taken. The doctrine has been so strict as to nullify the historical security
of the artisan against the world. On the other hand, the rule of this case,
within the limits of the decision, does not portend disaster for the SBA.
It may require the SBA to use ordinary business prudence, but it for
that agency to argue whether that is a detriment.
WILLIAM J. CARL.
TORTS-MALPRACTICE-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS RUNS FROM DATE OF DiS-
COVERY NOT FROM DATE OF NEGLIGENT ACT.-In a medical malpractice
action brought ten years after an operation, plaintiff alleged that the
defendant surgeon negligently left a surgical sponge in plaintiff's hip.
Defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted, the trial court
holding the action was barred by the statute of limitations.' On appeal,
held, reversed. The statute of limitations did not commence running until
the plaintiff discovered or reasonably should have discovered the pres-
ence of the foreign object. Johnson v. St. Patrick's Hospital, 23 State
Rep. 581, 417 P.2d 469 (Mont. 1966).
Statutes of limitation generally are held to be statutes of repose
"Bumb v. United States, supra note 30; United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 347(1966).
45Ibid.
'Instant case at 821.
"Supra note 44.
"Supra note 44 at 347.
'REVISED CODES OP MONTANA, 1947, § 93-2605(3). (Hereinafter REvISED CODES OF
MONTANA are cited R.C.M.)
.1.966]
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